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2Abstract
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) is a form of statistical quality control adopted
by FDA as a regulatory tool to ensure the safety of seafood and juice products. HACCP evolved from
the teachings of Walter A. Shewhart and W. Edwards Deming, pioneers in the ﬁeld of statistical qual-
ity control. Their revolutionary concept—controlling the quality of the product by controlling critical
steps in the product’s manufacture rather than relying upon end-product inspection—provided man-
ufacturers with a scientiﬁc means of identifying and preventing potential hazards from impairing
product quality. FDA adopted HACCP-like regulations for low-acid canned foods and acidiﬁed foods
in the 1970s, requiring food processors to control the heat sterilization portions of their manufactur-
ing processes in order to prevent botulism toxin from forming in the ﬁnal product. The regulations
identiﬁed the hazards and manufacturing controls to be instituted—tasks that HACCP leaves to
the manufacturer. Indeed, FDA adopted seafood HACCP regulations in 1995 as a means of shifting
the burden of identifying the myriad seafood hazards and appropriate manufacturing controls from
the Agency to food processors. Although both FDA and industry have struggled in their transition
to a HACCP system, federal regulators continue to view HACCP with favor. In 2001, FDA chose
HACCP for its regulation of juice products, ﬁnding HACCP to be a ﬂexible regulatory tool that
both promotes industry self-education and allows manufacturers to engage in innovative methods of
quality control. Although pure HACCP regulations continue to be unpopular with some members
of the food industry, the concepts underlying HACCP are likely to inform FDA’s promulgation of
current good manufacturing practices for the food and dietary supplement industries.
Introduction
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) is a scientiﬁc quality control method used in vari-
ous industries to ensure that manufactured goods meet certain quality and identity standards set by the
manufacturer. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”; “the Agency”) and U.S. Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) now require certain food manufacturers to institute HACCP plans in order to ensure
the safety and quality of high-risk foods within the food supply. A HACCP compliance program consists of
seven principles:
(1) Conduct a hazard analysis;
(2) Determine the critical control points (CCPs);
(3) Establish critical limits;
(4) Establish monitoring procedures;
(5) Establish corrective actions;
(6) Establish veriﬁcation procedures; and
(7) Establish record-keeping and documentation procedures.1
The seven principles of HACCP outline a procedure whereby food manufacturers can identify potential
safety and quality hazards associated with their food product; identify portions or steps of the manufactur-
ing process—critical control points (CCPs)—at which precautions can be taken to avoid the appearance of
3such hazards in the ﬁnal food product; establish procedures whereby those critical portions of the manufac-
turing process can be monitored, veriﬁed, and, if necessary, corrected; and establish a record-keeping system
that provides manufacturers with documentation of the proper functioning of their manufacturing process,
documentation that also enables the manufacturer to demonstrate compliance with good manufacturing
practices requirements under federal law.
FDA currently requires seafood and juice manufacturers to institute HACCP plans, and has adopted HACCP
principles in its regulation of low-acid canned foods and acidiﬁed foods. FDA also has implemented vol-
untary HACCP programs for dairy “Grade A” products (in conjunction with the National Conference on
Interstate Milk Shipments), food service establishments (restaurants) and food retailers (supermarkets).2
USDA requires manufacturers of meat and poultry products to comply with HACCP plans.3
Although the adoption of HACCP as a regulatory compliance tool is a relatively recent phenomenon, the
quality control concepts embodied within HACCP date back at least over 70 years and themselves reﬂect the
advances in manufacturing and quality control made during the Industrial Revolution.4 This paper reviews
the development of and rationale behind statistical quality control methodologies in manufacturing (parts I
to III); the application of HACCP-like quality control measures to the manufacture of low-acid canned foods
(part IV); and the advantages and disadvantages of HACCP, as viewed through the lens of FDA’s regulation
of seafood (parts V to VIII) and juice (part IX). The paper concludes with a brief outlook at the future
of HACCP (part X). Throughout the discussion, this paper introduces the reader to the HACCP concepts
and regulations, and explains why HACCP continues to gain in importance in the areas of food quality and
safety.
Part I
The term quality control refers to any set of activities designed to ensure the quality of a product.5 Although
commonly used in the context of manufactured goods, the term quality control also applies to the production
of food products including agricultural goods. Indeed, selective breeding of animals and plants in agriculture
can be characterized as eﬀorts to control the ﬁnal quality of agricultural goods. Through artiﬁcial selection,
a farmer may seek to increase milk production in cows, increase the average egg production of his chicken
population, or grow and reproduce wheat with rust resistance.6 Furthermore, the use of specialized cultiva-
tion methods, machinery, fertilizers, insecticides, and herbicides also represent longstanding and widespread
agricultural quality control measures. Let us not forget visual, tactile and olfactory inspection of the ﬁnal
agricultural products by the producer, perhaps the simplest and most direct means of checking the quality
of the food product. Finally, to the extent our consumer complaints reach the farmer’s ears, each one of us
directly engages in quality control, using our criticisms and complaints of the ﬁnal agricultural product to
help the farmer create a better and better-accepted consumer product.
2 See generally FDA’s website for HACCP. Online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼lrd/haccp.html.
3 Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems; Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 38806
(July 25, 1996).
4 See generally Walter A. Shewhart, Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control (W. Edwards Deming
ed., 1939).
5 See, e.g., Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 963 (1991).
6 Anthony J.F. Griﬃths et al., An Introduction to Genetic Analysis 805-807 (6th ed., 1996).
4Quality control of food products, therefore, dates back thousands of years. It is not a new or specialized
endeavor. Yet, because of technological and sociological changes, modern food production in the indus-
trialized world hardly resembles that of a century ago. Scientiﬁc advances and new food technology have
dramatically expanded the food choices available to consumers. Furthermore, the 20th century witnessed
drastic changes in demographics, lifestyle choices, disposable income, and price of consumer goods, resulting
in a marked shift away from self-harvesting, self-storing, and self-processing of foods.7 In particular, the size
of households decreased, and the number of elderly increased; women increasingly joined the work force and
sacriﬁced leisure time which might have been spent preparing meals; real per capita disposable income rose,
allowing households to expend more resources on food; and the price of prepared foods became cheaper than
their home-prepared counterparts (factoring in the costs of time and labor). Families, with increased income
and decreased leisure time, increasingly turned to prepared foods and food-away-from-home, which largely
consisted of processed and pre-prepared foods.8
Consumers shifted their preferences away from traditional, locally-produced agricultural goods, many of
which needed only simple quality control plans, towards mass-produced agricultural and processed foods,
which often required special means to ensure the foods’ sterility and quality as they journeyed their consid-
erable distance from manufacturer to consumer. This shift dramatically impacted the manner in which the
federal government would need to regulate food and quality control. As Archibald and Dahl noted:
[T]rends in consumer tastes and preferences raise some new regulatory issues. The trend toward
consumption of fully and partially prepared foods, eaten either at home or away from home, increases
the potential for food-borne disease related to its handling and also introduces additional ’critical
control points’ into manufacturing processes. Likewise, while consumer interest in diet and nutrition
provides ﬁrms with the opportunity for new product development, it is also likely to raise new
regulatory issues related to product content, identity, labeling and advertising.9
With the introduction of new advances in food technology, manufacturing, and transportation also came the
introduction of new accidents that arose when the technology failed. Of particular concern to manufactur-
ers, regulators, and public health oﬃcials was the potential for widespread microbiological contamination
of new food products. Accordingly, the National Academy of Sciences’ Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Food Mi-
crobiology published a report in 1964 calling upon industry and government to collaborate on the following
quality control activities: (1) improvement in the detection, investigation and reporting of foodborne dis-
ease; (2) continuous monitoring of potentially hazardous foods for microbial contamination; (3) development
of improved technologies for identifying microbial agents of foodborne disease; (4) modernization of food
protection programs and practices; and (5) increased research and education in food microbiology and other
ﬁelds concerning food and public health.10
The following years saw repeated calls for attention to the problem of foodborne disease and quality control.
7 Jean Kinsey and Dale Heien, Factors Inﬂuencing the Consumption and Production of Processed Foods, in Economics
of Food Processing in the United States 47-48 (Chester O. McCorkle, Jr. ed., 1988).
8 Id. at 47-61.
10 See Symposium, 1971 National Conference on Food Protection 21 (1971) (Statement of Keith H. Lewis, Ph.D., Director,
Oﬃce of Food Sanitation, Bureau of Foods, FDA). The 1971 National Conference on Food Protection was sponsored by the
American Public Health Association and published by the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare; Food and Drug
Administration; Public Health Service.
5In 1971, the American Public Health Association (APHA), with funding from FDA, organized a National
Conference on Food Protection attended by members or representatives of APHA, FDA, USDA, the Canadian
Food and Drug Directorate, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and the food
industry.11 Various speakers recognized that modern changes in food consumption habits and food technology
had created the potential for widespread foodborne illness. One conference workshop noted, Beginning at
least ﬁve years ago, the major food poisoning outbreaks have originated in schools, canteens, hospitals,
restaurants, cafes, delicatessens, socials, catering organizations, and other mass feeding places. This is
not due solely to mounting hazards, but also to an enormous increase in the number of meals and meal
components prepared away from home.12 William O. Beers, bacteriologist and president of Kraftco Corp,
lamented that advances in food safety had not kept up with advances in food production; he stated, Where
we have had a literal revolution in food production, processing, and service and retailing facilities, with a
resulting multiplication of the possibilities of microbial contamination, food safety measures have essentially
failed to keep pace with overall advances.13
The 1971 APHA conference workshop reports urged a revolution in food safety regulation in order to en-
sure that the revolution in food technology not be overshadowed by the technology’s potential hazards.
Importantly, the workshop participants recognized that an eﬀective food safety regulatory program would
necessarily require oversight of food producers’ quality control programs. For example, the workshop on
the Prevention of Contamination of Commercially Processed Foods concluded that the implementation of
general good manufacturing practices (GMPs) requirements alone would not suﬃce to prevent against micro-
bial contamination; the report suggested that because the potential for microbial contamination of diﬀerent
food products necessarily depended upon the characteristics of the food product and its manufacturing
processes, eﬀective microbial control would require eﬀective control and oversight over the critical control
points (CCPs) in the manufacturing process and subsequent handling of the ﬁnished food product.14 CCPs
are critical points in the entire food production process, from obtaining the raw materials to consumption
of the ﬁnished product, at which the hazards of microbial contamination, poor quality, or other unwanted
characteristics can be addressed and prevented by the implementation of certain controls. The workshop
identiﬁed potential CCPs with regard to the handling of raw materials, processing the raw materials (in-
cluding the design of equipment and cleaning procedures), environment, personnel (e.g., workers’ handling
of food), ﬁnished products (recommending an audit system for testing products from manufacturing lines
and from the ﬁeld), and distribution (e.g., refrigeration of the ﬁnished product during distribution).15
FDA proved to be very receptive to the workshop’s recommendations. The Vice Chairman of the workshop
on the Prevention of Contamination of Commercially Processed Foods was Howard E. Bauman, Ph.D., of
the Pillsbury Co. Under contract to provide food for NASA’s space program, Pillsbury had implemented
a quality control program that focused upon the identiﬁcation, monitoring, and control of CCPs.16 Dr.
Bauman believed that such an approach to quality control was necessary if the food industry was to meet its
11 Id. at II-III (Preface).
12 Id. at 143 (Report from Workshop 7: Training and Utilization of Professional and Nonprofessional Manpower).
13 Id. at 27-29 (Statement of William O. Beers, President, Kraftco Corp.).
14 Id. at 56-83 (Report from Workshop 2: Prevention of Contamination of Commercially Processed Foods).
15 Id.
16 Bud Hazelkorn, The HACCP Epic, Meat Processing, North American Edition (2004). Online at
http://www.meatnews.com/mp/northamerican/dsp particle mp.cfm?artNum=551.
6obligation of improving its manufacturing processes and producing safe food.17 FDA shared Dr. Bauman’s
beliefs, and Pillsbury entered a contract with the FDA to train the Agency in its quality control methods. The
Pillsbury training course had a demonstrable eﬀect on FDA’s regulatory approach to ensuring food safety.
In a 1972 Symposium on Newer Food Processing Technology, attended by representatives from industry,
FDA, USDA, state and Canadian health departments,18 FDA oﬃcial Dr. Virgil O. Wodicka explained the
Agency’s new regulatory priorities:
The program of the Food and Drug Administration in enforcing the law over the last generation
has put primary emphasis on operating conditions in the processing plant on the day the inspector
came in. This would detect practices that were habitually wrong or that happened to be wrong on
that day. If they were bad 10 percent of the time and the inspector came in on the average of once
every 6 years, the chance of detection, much less correction, was not very great. It is now the intent
of the Food and Drug Administration to convert as rapidly as it can to a system of inspecting the
producer’s quality control. If the producer can demonstrate good quality control he will qualify for
a minimum of attention. If his quality control is found defective or if he is suﬃciently defensive to
refuse to disclose it, he will earn increased attention in proportion to the assessment of the likelihood
of the hazard.19
***
[Oﬀering broad guidelines as to FDA’s new approach in evaluating quality control programs, Wodicka
stated:] Let me use some of the jargon we are now taking advantage of in the training course that
we have contracted with Pillsbury to develop for us, that is, to identify the ’critical control points.’
These are the points that will make or break the process, such as places where contamination can
be introduced, or where contamination is reduced. At these critical points, the question is what
controls are necessary and to what extent are they necessary. The audit of a system would consist
of the identiﬁcation of these points, and the assessment of the adequacy of control that is in eﬀect
at those points. Obviously, there has to be some kind of feedback control, so it is not just a matter
of writing a history. It is a matter of modifying the operation to correct any variations from the
state of control that are found.20
Dr. Wodicka’s statements revealed a recognition that food inspections no longer suﬃced to prevent micro-
biological contamination of food or ensure the safety and quality of the food supply. Over the 20th century,
food inspection agencies relied heavily upon food inspection to police the safety of the food supply. However,
in the age of mass production, new food technology and globalization, a regulatory system focused upon
inspection was neither feasible nor desirable to regulators or manufacturers.
As Dr. Wodicka noted, inspection of ﬁnished food products may not establish a reliable account of the safety
of food entering the food supply. With limited resources and a limited number of inspections, the FDA could
17 Symposium, Proceedings of a Symposium on Newer Food Processing Technology. August 14-16, 1972. Safety and
Quality Assurance. Pages 2, 108 (American Medical Association 1973). The 1972 Symposium on Newer Food Processing
Technology was sponsored by the American Medical Association (AMA) Food Industry Liason Committee and the Food
Science Committee, Council on Foods and Nutrition.
18 Id. at 267-69.
7not ensure that periodic, intermittent inspections could detect chronic, intermittent hazards.21 Inspectors
might show up on the one day when the manufacturer’s problems did not materialize. Furthermore, in-
spection of ﬁnished food-products is expensive and time-consuming to both manufacturers and regulators.
Inspection often requires testing and destruction of large amounts of the ﬁnished product in order to gain
a statistically powerful and accurate conclusion as to safety. With regards to microbiological tests, rapid,
reliable and eﬃcient tests were scarce; accurate tests often were too cumbersome and time-consuming to
constitute a regular part of the manufacturing process, and quick homebrew tests developed by manufactur-
ers often lacked validation and recognition by regulatory oﬃcials.22 Microbiological tests were also limited
in their usefulness in day-to-day inspections, because results from such tests often were not immediately
available.23
The lack of a single, uniform system of food regulation also decreased the eﬀectiveness and eﬃciency of food
inspection programs. The president of the APHA asked, [W]hy do persons from 10 to 30 local agencies, 4
or 5 states, and 2 or 3 Federal agencies have to inspect the same establishment?24 The multitude of inspec-
tion programs—each having diﬀerent perspectives, responsibilities, objectives, standards, and enforcement
policies—complicated manufacturers’ compliance eﬀorts and sometimes placed great responsibility in the
hands of ineﬀective state or local programs. This regulatory system, fractionated into various parts and
governed by the diﬀerent concerns of the local, state, and federal governments, appeared to be obsolete
and unworkable, especially given the increasingly national and international nature of food production and
distribution.25
Given this background, industry and regulators increasingly saw industry self-inspection as a solution to
enhancing the quality and safety of food, while simultaneously reducing the burden on regulatory agencies.
The proposed industry self-inspection would not simply replace the ineﬀective and costly end-inspection by
regulators with similar end-inspection by manufacturers. No, this proposed self-inspection would shift its
focus to the entire manufacturing process in order to detect sources of contamination or poor quality. It
would draw upon the lessons learned from the management and quality control revolution in other industries,
as pioneered by Walter A. Shewhart, W. Edwards Deming, and others. These lessons follow.
Part II
As discussed above, the concept of quality control has been with us for the ages. However, events during
the 20th Century helped to spur a revolution in quality control, perhaps none so inﬂuential as the two
World Wars, and the resulting need for high quality, mass produced goods.26 The late 19th century had
seen Frederick Taylor’s introduction of scientiﬁc management of the production line, and the early 20th
century had seen Henry Ford’s introduction of the moving assembly line. But these innovations focused
21 In FY 1971-72, FDA employed 242 food inspectors. Peter Barton Hutt and Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law
232 (2d ed. 1991).
22 1971 National Conference on Food Protection, supra note 10, at 63 (Report from Workshop 2: Prevention of Contam-
ination of Commercially Processed Foods).
23 1971 National Conference on Food Protection, supra note 10, at 13 (Statement of P. Walton Purdom, Ph.D., President
of APHA).
24 Id. at 12.
25 Id. at 11-13.
26 George Mouradian, The Quality Revolution. A History of the Quality Movement 101 (2002).
8upon facilitating and increasing production (e.g., through the use of standardized parts and coordination of
various steps in the manufacturing process); they did not focus upon quality control per se, and up through
the 1930’s end-inspection of the ﬁnal product remained manufacturers’ primary quality control technique.27
Thus, those innovations spoke more to the quantity of goods produced by mass production, rather than to
their quality.
The revolution in quality control came from the application of statistical methods to the mass production
of goods in the early 20th century. Walter A. Shewhart, the Father of Modern Quality Assurance,” is given
credit for pioneering this ﬁeld.28 In his lectures to the USDA Graduate School, Shewhart explained the
rationale and historical development of statistical quality control. A brief summary of his teachings follows:
In the 19th century, the ideology of mass production characterized manufacturing as an exact science—i.e., as
an attempt to reproduce machines and parts to exact dimensions.29 However, manufacturers soon realized
that it was very costly to make exact replicas. Furthermore, in most cases the costs were unnecessary;
manufacturers could make replica parts that were not exact duplicates, but were close enough to the ideal
so as to ensure a product of high quality. Thus, manufacturers adopted a go limit, a minimum clearance or
threshold value at which the replica was close enough to being exact such that production could continue.30
The adoption of go limits proved eﬃcient, but presented other diﬃculties in the context of the production
of interchangeable parts. To illustrate the problem, imagine two interconnecting parts, Part 1 and Part 2.
Part 1 may meet its go limit, and Part 2 may meet its go limit, but the two parts still may not properly
ﬁt together. The problem remains that the production of each part has not accounted for the subsequent
use of that part with other connecting parts. In other words, the production of Part 1 must account for the
subsequent interaction of Part 1 with Part 2. This is accomplished by the introduction of a “no-go” limit to
complement the go limit. Around 1870, manufacturers began using go and no-go limits—lower and upper
tolerance limits that ensured the proper interaction between two ﬁtting parts.31 As long as manufacturers
produced parts that individually stayed within their go and no-go limits, the parts would ﬁt together and
manufacturers need not waste time and money being unnecessarily exact.
The quality control method described above focused entirely upon the physical characteristics of the end
product. As such, it required inspection of the end product to determine whether the end product was
defective—i.e., whether it exceeded the go/no-go limits. Under this approach, manufacturers bore the
costs of inspection, as well as the costs of defective products. Thus, manufacturers sought to increase
production eﬃciency by identifying the causes of defective products. More speciﬁcally, they aimed to reduce
the percentage of defective products to the extent that it was economical—i.e., to the point where the cost
of controlling the production process equaled the savings brought about by the decrease in the number of
defective products.32 Furthermore, manufacturers sought to institute a method of statistical sampling of
end products that minimized the costs of inspections but also ensured quality.
27 Id. at 101-03.
28 Id. at 87.
29 Walter A. Shewhart, Statistical Method from the Viewpoint of Quality Control 2-3 (W. Edwards Deming ed., 1939).
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 4.
9At the dawn of the 20th century, the challenge remained to create an eﬃcient system of quality control
that permitted the production of items within certain speciﬁcations and required a minimum of end-product
inspection. Manufacturers tackled this challenge by linking the production process to the variability of the
ﬁnal product through statistical quality control. As described in further detail below, statistical quality
control utilizes trends in statistical sampling of the ﬁnished product to indicate whether the manufacturing
process is controlled or uncontrolled. When the results indicate an uncontrolled manufacturing process, a
strategy is identiﬁed to correct the problem through changes to the manufacturing process. The strategy is
implemented, and new statistical sampling of the ﬁnished product determines whether the strategy has been
successful. If unsuccessful, a new strategy is implemented and the process is repeated.33
Implementation of statistical quality control requires statistical sampling or inspection of the end product.
As explained above, the modern manufacturer tolerates a certain amount of variation in the ﬁnal product
within a range deﬁned by the go/no-go limits. He calculates the variation in the ﬁnal product by taking
a statistical sample, measuring some characteristic of the product, and calculating the mean and standard
deviation of that product. Ideally, the mean should equal the desired value of that characteristic, and the
standard deviation (variation from the mean) should be small. For example, if a pipe manufacturer wishes to
create pipes with a 2-inch internal diameter, he hopes that a statistical analysis of his pipes reveals a mean
diameter of 2-inches with a small standard deviation. Now, let us assume that the manufacturer has already
established a process capable of reliably producing 2-inch pipes with an acceptable standard deviation of
0.01 inches. If statistical sampling of the ﬁnished product reveals that the manufacturer is producing pipes
with diameters that vary considerably (i.e., more than one or more standard deviations) from the mean of
2 inches, then the manufacturer has reason to believe that his manufacturing process is out of control.
Shewhart devised a method whereby the results of consecutive end product sampling can be plotted on
a “quality control chart,” such that the manufacturer possesses a graphical representation of the control
of his manufacturing process over time34 A two-dimensional schematic diagram is presented below. The
x-axis (horizontal axis) represents time, and the y-axis (vertical axis) represents the value of the physical
characteristic being measured.
============================ No-go limit / L2
———————————————— Control or action limit / B 2.01 in
Desired value 2 in.
———————————————— Control or action limit / A 1.99 in.
============================ Go limit / L1
The quality control chart introduces the new concept of “control” or “action” limits, set within the go/no-go
limits L1 and L2. Control limits are meant to represent the normal expected variation one would ﬁnd if the
manufacturing process was acting under control. Control limits are calculated as the mean desired value
+/- some multiple of the standard deviation.35 If in our above example, the pipe manufacturer wanted to
detect variation greater than one standard deviation from the mean, he would set the control limits at 1.99
33 See Sid Sytsima, Quality and Statistical Process Control. Online at http://www.sytsma.com/tqmtools/ctlchtprinciples.html.
34 See Shewhart, supra note 29, at 4-8.
35 See James O. Westgard, QC—The Idea. Online at http://www.westgard.com/lesson11.htm.
10and 2.01 inches. Along the x-axis, the manufacturer would plot the mean diameter values measured from
newly produced pipes. If the plotted points fall within the control limits, the manufacturer typically can be
assured that his manufacturing process is under control.36
Control limits therefore serve as a warning sign that the manufacturing process may not reliably be producing
items at or around the desired value. Shewhart explained as follows (refer to the above chart for clariﬁcation):
Statistical theory then stepped in (1924) with the concept of two action or control limits A and B
that lie, in general within L1 and L2.... These limits are to be set so that when the observed quality
of a piece of product falls outside of them, even though the observation be still with the limits L1 and
L2, it is desirable to look at the manufacturing process in order to discover and remove, if possible,
one or more causes of variation that need not be left to chance. In other words, whereas the limits
L1 and L2 provide a means of gauging the product already made, the action limits A and B provide
a means of directing action toward the process with a view to the elimination of assignable causes
of variation so that the quality of the product not yet made may be less variable on the average.37
***
[A]lthough the action limits A and B may lie within the tolerance limits L1 and L2, the product
already produced and found by inspection to be within the limits L1 and L2 is still considered to
conform, even if outside A and B. In other words, the action limits A and B do not apply as a
gauge for product already made: their function is to call attention to evidence for believing that the
manufacturing process includes assignable causes of variation in the quality that may give trouble
in the future if they are not found and removed.38
Thus, when the data points plotted on the quality control chart approach the control limits, the manufacturer
is alerted to the fact that there may be uncontrolled variation in the manufacturing process. In the context
of statistical quality control, inspection and statistical sampling of the ﬁnal product are not implemented to
determine whether or not the ﬁnal product is defective. Rather, they are implemented in order to monitor
a manufacturing process that is known to reliably produce a quality product. Statistical quality control
achieves the integration of production, speciﬁcations, and inspection, thereby eliminating the need for costly
and ineﬃcient end product inspection. It allows for manufacturers to shift their attention from end product
inspection to identiﬁcation of the causes of product deﬁciencies within the manufacturing process.
Part III
The shift in focus from end-product testing to control of the manufacturing process remains the conceptual
breakthrough of the quality control revolution. This breakthrough allowed manufacturers to dramatically
increase the eﬃciency of their operations. W. Edwards Deming, a colleague of Shewhart, expanded the
36 Id.
11concept of statistical quality control into “Total Quality Management (TQM),” a method of management
that requires the entire organization to apply principles of statistical quality control.39 Deming brought his
TQM concept to post-war Japan and helped to transform its devastated manufacturing base into a global
giant.40
Deming’s concept of integrating statistical quality control into the eﬃcient management of a ﬁrm forms the
link between the quality control chart and HACCP. The quality control chart serves to warn a manufacturer
when the manufacturing process is uncontrolled. When statistical end-product sampling yields numbers that
approach or exceed the control limit, the manufacturer must review the manufacturing process to ﬁnd the
sources of variability lurking within. If the manufacturer has not been monitoring the manufacturing process,
then this review process will be diﬃcult and costly. If, however, he has been monitoring and documenting
key variables in the manufacturing process over time, then the manufacturer can simply compare his quality
control charts with his manufacturing records in order to pinpoint the problem. TQM would therefore require
routine monitoring of the manufacturing process.
In an eﬃcient, integrated system, inspection of the manufacturing process becomes as important, if not more
important than inspection of the end product. Deming explained: “Inspection is too late, ineﬀective, costly.
When a lot of product leaves the door of a supplier, it is too late to do anything about the quality of the lot.
Scrap, downgrading, and rework are not corrective action on the process. Quality comes not from inspection,
but from improvement of the process. ...In place of 100 per cent inspection should go improvement of the
process and elimination of inspection.”41
How might a ﬁrm eliminate inspection? Well, if a manufacturer could identify the critical sources of variation
in the ﬁnal product, properly control those sources of variation within the manufacturing process, and
document the control of the variation, then the manufacturer could be assured that the ﬁnal product would
be of uniform quality. In other words, the manufacturer’s control of critical points in the manufacturing
process prevents any defects from occurring in the ﬁnal product. The manufacturer may not eliminate end
product inspection altogether, but he has essentially eliminated his reliance upon it.
The elimination of reliance upon end-product inspection can be illustrated through the example of aseptic
canning. The manufacture of aseptically-sealed cans requires four steps: (1) the sterilization of the food
product; (2) the transfer of the sterilized product into sterilized canning; (3) the sealing of the can in a
sterile atmosphere, and (4) the gentle handling of the sealed can on contamination-free equipment.42 In
all of these steps, the hazard to be avoided in the end product is microbial contamination. Thus, the
manufacturer will test the ﬁnal product for microbial growth through the use of some biological assay; and
will reject the product if the assay indicates a threshold amount of bacterial growth. The manufacturer will
39 Mouradian, supra note 26, at 92.
40 Id. at 91; Deming was a highly celebrated ﬁgure in Japan. The Union of Japanese Scientists and Engineers instituted
the Deming Price, the country’s highest business award given to a company for the innovative use of statistical theory in
organization, consumer research, product design and production. Additionally, in 1960 the Emperor of Japan rewarded Deming
with the Second Order Medal of the Sacred Treasure, for his help in transforming the Japanese economy. See The W. Edwards
Deming Institute, Biography of W. Edwards Deming. Online at http://www.deming.org/theman/biography.html.
41 W. Edwards Deming, Quality, Productivity, and Competitive Position 22 (MIT, Center for Advanced Engineering Study
1982) (emphasis added).
42 Keith Ito, A Critical Appraisal of Aseptic Canning, in Proceedings of a Symposium on Newer Food Processing Tech-
nology, supra note 17, at 24-26.
12also test the ﬁnal product for quality—e.g., taste, consistency, texture, color, etc.
Because end product testing is costly and ineﬃcient, the manufacturer will try to prevent microbial growth
through proper processing techniques—i.e., by heating the product at a speciﬁc temperature for a speciﬁc
period of time, and by processing the product in a clean, sterile environment.43 The manufacturer will
experiment with diﬀerent combinations of these two variables—time and heat—until he has established
limitations upon these variables that ensure the ﬁnal product’s sterility and quality. Rather than focus
upon keeping microbial growth in the ﬁnished product within the “control limits,” the manufacturer will
focus upon keeping the temperature and time of sterilization controlled within their “critical limits.” The
manufacturer will also institute controls to maintain a sterile environment, establishing critical limits for the
measurement of sterility in the plant.
The manufacturer will keep daily records of (a) the beginning and end of each sterilization step; (b) the
temperatures achieved during sterilization; (c) the times when the machinery is cleaned and sterilized; and (d)
other important occurrences (e.g., if production is stopped).44 These records ensure that the manufacturer
is monitoring the critical manufacturing steps, and provide a manufacturing history for the plant.
End product inspections of aseptically-sealed cans decrease in their importance and scope as they become
ancillary to the daily inspections of the sterilization process. 45 Still, occasional end product inspections
may be valuable as additional checks upon the product’s ﬁnal quality. If the end product inspections
reveal microbial growth exceeding the designated control limits, the manufacturer can refer back to his
records to help identify the problem. Because the records provide a manufacturing history of the plant, the
manufacturer can utilize the records as a troubleshooting tool in identifying the source of variation within
the manufacturing process. Once the problem is identiﬁed, the manufacturer will institute new controls
over the manufacturing process, such that he can continue to control quality through monitoring of critical
control points in the manufacture, rather than through inspection of the ﬁnal product.
The aseptic canning example demonstrates how integration of the three processes of speciﬁcation, production
and inspection result in an eﬃcient quality control system that does not rely on end product inspections.
The example is also a rough illustration of the seven basic principles of a HACCP plan. Below I introduce the
basic HACCP regulatory requirements, and demonstrate how HACCP reformulates the concepts introduced
by Shewhart and Deming.
HACCP step 1 requires manufacturers to conduct a hazard analysis; they must identify food hazards and
implement a written HACCP plan for food hazards that are “reasonably likely to occur” during processing.46
Step 2 requires manufacturers to identify within the HACCP plan the critical control points (CCPs)—the
points in the manufacturing process where the identiﬁed food hazards can be minimized—and the measures
43 Id. at 26.
44 Id. at 28-29.
45 Dole’s manufacturing processes illustrate manufacturer reliance on control of the canning process: “All of the Dole
systems have an instrument panel to continually monitor the temperatures at critical points. For example, the temperatures of
the superheated steam gong to the tunnels and to the cover sterilizer as well as the actual temperatures inside the sterilizers are
continuously recorded. Moreover, temperatures in the ﬁlling and closing chambers and the product ﬁll temperature are usually
recorded.” W.P. Segner, Aseptic Canning of Low-Acid Foods in Rigid Metal Containers, in Proceedings of a Symposium on
Newer Food Processing Technology, supra note 17, at 40.
46 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.7, 120.8, 123.6.
13that will be taken to control the hazards.47 The third step requires manufacturers to identify and establish
critical limits, the outer boundaries in which physical, biological, or chemical parameters must remain in
order to control the food hazards. 48
In our example, a manufacturer of aseptically-sealed cans would identify microbial contamination as the
hazard reasonably likely to occur during processing. The CCPs would include the stages at which the food
is sterilized, the food is transferred to a can, the can is aseptically sealed, and the sealed can is safely
handled. The manufacturer would control the temperature and time of sterilization, and/or the sterility of
the environment, as each CCP required. Control would be established through the use of critical limits. For
example, the manufacture may require that the machinery that sterilizes the food achieve and maintain a
temperature of at least 200 degrees F for at least 30 seconds.
HACCP steps 4, 6 and 7—establishing monitoring, record-keeping and veriﬁcation procedures—ensure the
proper day-to-day functioning of the manufacturing process. Manufacturers must maintain records docu-
menting the ongoing application of the HACCP; this requires written proof that the processor is monitoring
the critical control points and critical limits, i.e., the actual recording of times, temperatures, and other mea-
surements required by the HACCP plan.49 Furthermore, the food processors must verify that the HACCP
plan is being implemented properly. Trained individuals must review the company’s HACCP records and
consumer complaints, check the calibration of process monitoring instruments, and, when necessary, conduct
periodic end-product or in-process testing.50 Because scientiﬁc knowledge is always expanding, the food
processor must also validate its HACCP plan annually; if the food processor had earlier concluded that no
hazards were present and no HACCP plan was needed, it must reassess its earlier hazard analysis whenever
there are any changes that could “reasonably aﬀect” whether a food hazard now exists.51
Under these HACCP steps, the manufacturer of aseptically-sealed cans would monitor the food sterilization
equipment, and record the temperatures and times of sterilization at regular intervals throughout the day.
Periodically, the manufacturer would re-calibrate the equipment’s thermometer, in order to ensure that the
temperature measurements continue to be precise and accurate, and engage in end-product microbial testing
of the ﬁnished food product. Finally, the manufacturer would continuously keep himself informed regarding
the latest scientiﬁc and technological development in the ﬁeld of aseptic canned food production. On an
annual basis, he would review his HACCP plan and make any changes necessary to ensure the safety of his
ﬁnished food product.
The ﬁnal HACCP step (step 5) requires manufacturers to establish corrective actions. Manufacturers must
include within their HACCP plans corrective actions for situations in which a deviation from a critical limit
occurs—e.g., when sterilization machinery does not maintain the proper temperature.52 These plans should
ensure that any injurious product is withheld from the stream of commerce and that the cause of the deviation
is corrected.53 Should a deviation occur for which there is no plan, the manufacturer must quarantine the
47 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.7(a)(3), 120.7(a)(5), 123.6(c)(2).
48 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.3(e), 123.3(c).
49 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.11(a)(2), 120.12, 123.8(a)(3), 123.9.
50 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.11(a)(1), 123.8(a)(2).
51 See id. Such changes may include changes in the source of raw materials or the intended use of the ﬁnished product by
consumers.
52 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.8(b)(5), 120.10, 123.6(c)(5), 123.7
53 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(a), 123.7(b).
14potentially injurious product; determine whether the food product meets the safety criteria for distribution;
and take appropriate action to ensure that any injurious product does not reach consumers and that the
cause of the deviation is corrected.54 Anytime the manufacturer takes corrective actions, the actions must
be documented.55 Importantly, when a deviation occurs for which there is no plan, the manufacturer must
reassess the HACCP plan, and make any necessary modiﬁcations to the plan; this requirement ensures that
when unexpected deviations occur, the manufacturer will reassess and rework the safety and quality controls
it has built into the system.56
Thus, the 7 principles of HACCP essentially reiterate the lessons of Shewhart and Deming in a diﬀerent
form. Speciﬁcally, HACCP directs manufacturers not to focus upon end product inspection, but rather
to focus primarily upon the manufacturing process. FDA has chosen to adopt HACCP for foods at high
risk for microbial contamination out of recognition that end-product testing is often an ineﬀective means
for preventing both the occurrence of hazards in the ﬁnal food product and the distribution of hazardous
food to consumers.57 HACCP may have been borne from statistical concepts and managerial theories that
emphasized eﬃciency and economic beneﬁts, but it has been adopted as a regulatory tool by FDA for its
ability to protect the public health. 58 For the remainder of this paper, I discuss the application of HACCP
as a preventative measure against microbial contamination, noting the advantages of this eﬀective regulatory
tool.
Part IV
Although FDA did not nominally adopt HACCP as a regulatory tool until the mid 1990s, HACCP principles
served as the framework for FDA’s regulation of low-acid canned foods and acidiﬁed foods in the 1970s. These
regulations resulted from a 1971 petition to the FDA by the National Canners Association (“NCA”), urging
the agency to adopt good manufacturing practices for low-acid foods in “hermetically sealed containers which
are processed by heat either before or after being sealed in the container.”59 The NCA (now the National
Food Processors Association) was spurred into action by several outbreaks of botulism due to consumption
54 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(b), 123.7(c).
55 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 121.10(c), 123.7(d).
56 See 21 C.F.R. §§ 120.10(b), 123.7(c).
57 “Microbiological tests are seldom eﬀective for monitoring due to their time-consuming nature and problems with as-
suring detection of contaminants. Physical and chemical measurements are often preferred because they are rapid and usually
more eﬀective for assuring control of microbiological hazards. For example, the safety of pasteurized milk is based upon mea-
surements of time and temperature of heating rather than testing the heated milk to assure the absence of surviving pathogens.”
National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point Principles
and Application Guidelines (Aug. 14, 1997). Online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼comm/nacmcfp.html.
58 “The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety, eﬃcacy, and security of ...our na-
tion’s food supply[.] ...The FDA is also responsible for advancing the public health by helping to speed innovations that
make ...foods more eﬀective, safer, and more aﬀordable; and helping the public get the accurate, science-based information
they need to use ...foods to improve their health.” Food and Drug Administration, FDA Mission Statement. Online at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html.
59 Manufacture and Processing of Canned Foods, 36 Fed. Reg. 21688 (Nov. 12, 1971).
15of improperly processed canned foods.60 In 1971, botulism toxin in soup packed by Bon Vivant caused
one death and one severe illness, prompting coordinated eﬀorts between NCA and FDA to recall remaining
cans and notify consumers.61 The canned food industry needed some way to reassure the public that their
products were safe; the industry concluded that it could eﬀectively subvert the negative publicity and fear
arising from the Bon Vivant episode by proposing regulations that controlled for botulism.62
Botulism is a paralytic illness caused by a neurotoxin produced by the bacteria Clostridium botulinum.63
The bacteria can only survive in an anaerobic (oxygen-free) environment, such as is found in canned foods.64
Food processors may prevent botulism by heat sterilization, thereby inactivating the bacterial spores.65
Should the heat treatment not inactivate all the spores, processors may further inhibit bacterial growth by
creating an acidic environment having a pH less than 4.6.66 Furthermore, decreasing the water activity
of the food by adding salt also inhibits bacterial growth, by decreasing the amount of water available to
bacteria.67 Low-acid canned foods—i.e., foods “with a ﬁnished equilibrium pH greater than 4.6 and a water
activity (aw) greater than 0.85”68—harbor anaerobic environments that, when not properly heat sterilized,
lack the proper acidity and water activity to prohibit the growth and reproduction of the deadly C. botulinum
bacteria.
Therefore, NCA proposed rulemaking that would allow FDA to more eﬀectively regulate the manufacture
of low-acid foods and prevent botulism. NCA’s proposed rules required low-acid food processors: (1) to
ﬁle with the FDA forms specifying, inter alia, the sterilization times and temperatures to be used during
processing; (2) to equip “retort equipment”—machinery used for heat processing canned foods—with tem-
perature recording devices; (3) to train and certify retort operators; (4) to “code” all containers for purposes
of identiﬁcation during the product’s sale and distribution; (5) to record and certify certain information, such
as the product, the code number, the retort number, and sterilization times and temperatures; (6) to inspect
container closures; and (7) to report all instances of under-processing and spoilage.69 The proposed rules
also contained detailed depictions of manufacturing equipment, accompanied by recommended or required
speciﬁcations for the equipment.70 Finally, the proposed rules required low-acid food processors to register
with the FDA,71 and upon demand of an FDA employee, to “permit the inspection and copying by such
employee of the processing records...to verify that adequate processing and coding of such low-acid food
60 Food and Drug Administration, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, U.S. Food Safety System Country Report. Annex II Pre-
caution in U.S. Food Safety Decisionmaking, at Paragraph 69 (2000). Online at http://www.foodsafety.gov/∼fsg/fssyst4.html.
61 Edward Dunkelberger, The Statutory Basis for the FDA’s Food Safety Assurance Programs: From GMP, to Emergency
Permit Control, to HACCP, 50 Food & Drug L. J. 357, 364-65 (1995).
62 Id. at 366.
63 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Dept. of Health and Human Services, Disease Listing, Botulism,
General Information. Online at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/botulism g.htm; the ability of botulism
toxin, or “Botox”, to prevent muscle contraction explains its usefulness as a popular cosmetic injection. Food and Drug
Administration, Botox Cosmetic: A Look at Looking Good, FDA Consumer Magazine (July-August 2002). Online at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/2002/402 botox.html#illustration.
64 World Health Organization, Fact Sheet No. 270. Botulism. Online at
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/who270/en/.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Food and Drug Administration, Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook. Factors Aﬀecting
the Growth of Microorganisms in Foods. Online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼mow/app3.html.
68 21 C.F.R. § 113.3(n) (deﬁnition of low-acid foods).
69 36 Fed. Reg. at 21689-91.
70 Id. at 21691-96.
71 Id. at 21688.
16was performed.”72
Failure to meet any of the proposed rule’s requirements would constitute “a prima facie basis for the imme-
diate application of the emergency permit control provisions” of Section 404 of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act.73 Section 404 applies to classes of foods found by FDA to be injurious to the public health
when contaminated with micro-organisms, but for which there are no adequate means to determine whether
or not the foods are in fact injurious due to microbial contamination prior to their interstate shipment;
the statutory provision eﬀectively allows FDA to prohibit the interstate shipment of such classes of food,
unless food processors have obtained an emergency permit from the Agency.74 Importantly, § 404 grants
the Agency the power to condition the receipt and continued possession of the permit on the fulﬁllment of
speciﬁed manufacturing controls, and to freely inspect any place of manufacture for violations of the con-
ditions of the permit.75 Thus, the threat of harsh regulatory actions would ensure compliance with NCA’s
proposed regulations.
After evaluating the proposal and the comments, the FDA Commissioner decided that regulations should
be immediately promulgated.76 In November 1972, the Commissioner issued a tentative ﬁnal order estab-
lishing minimum good manufacturing processes for heat-sterilized low-acid foods, soliciting comments on
the tentative ﬁnal order.77 Two months later, in January 1973, the Agency adopted, in large part, NCA’s
proposed regulations as its own.78 Notably, FDA abandoned the requirement that food processors report to
the Agency all instances of under-processing and spoilage.79 In addition, the Agency temporarily set aside
the provisions dealing with enforcement of the good manufacturing practices. FDA wrote, “Such regulations,
including both the registration and record inspection provisions proposed by NCA and general procedural
regulations with respect to the use of section 404, are presently being developed in order to establish an
adequate enforcement mechanism.”80
In May 1973, FDA separately promulgated emergency permit regulations, consisting of general procedural
regulations for section 404,81 and regulations speciﬁc for low-acid canned foods.82 The regulations required
that (1) all current and future commercial processors of low-acid canned foods register with FDA and
provide the Agency information “including but not limited to the processing method, type of retort or
other thermal processing equipment, minimum initial temperature, time and temperature of processing
sterilizing value (Fo), or other equivalent scientiﬁc evidence of process adequacy, critical control factors
aﬀecting heat penetration, and source and date of the establishment of the process for each such low-acid
72 Id. at 21688, 21689.
73 Id. at 21688.
74 21 U.S.C. § 344.
75 Id.; Note that § 404 embodies the lessons of statistical quality control. It discounts the eﬀectiveness of end-product
inspection and mandates that manufacturers instead control their manufacturing processes.
76 Low-Acid Foods in Hermetically Sealed Containers, 37 Fed. Reg. 24117 (Nov. 14, 1972).
77 Id. at 24118.
78 Part 128b—Thermally Processed Low-Acid Foods Packaged in Hermetically Sealed Containers, 38 Fed. Reg. 2398
(Jan. 24, 1973).
79 See Part 90—Emergency Permit Control. Manufacturing and Processing of Thermally Processed Low-Acid Foods
Packaged in Hermetically Sealed Containers, 38 Fed. Reg. 12716, 12717 (Paragraph 10) (May 14, 1973).
80 38 Fed. Reg. at 2398.
81 38 Fed. Reg. at 12720. (FDA issued a correction at 38 Fed. Reg. 14174 (May 30, 1973), ﬁnal regulations at 39 Fed.
Reg. 3748 (Jan. 29, 1974), and an amendment at 39 Fed. Reg. 11876 (Apr. 1, 1974)).
82 38 Fed. Reg. at 12716.
17food in each container size”;83 (2) all operators of critical processing systems be under the supervision of a
trained manager;84 (3) food processors report instances of spoilage or process deviation where the lot of food
had entered distribution, in whole or in part;85 (4) food processors establish an eﬀective recall plan;86 (5)
processors systematically retain and review records of processing, deviations in processing, and inspections,
and permit the FDA to inspect and copy such records;87 and (6) food processors submit, upon request,
“any information concerning processes and procedures which is deemed necessary by the Food and Drug
Administration to determine the attainment of commercial sterility.”88 Should the food processor violate the
above regulations, the Agency could determine that the processor needed an emergency permit to resume
manufacturing—the issuance and retention of the permit, of course, being dependent upon future compliance
with the regulations.89
In 1976, FDA proposed some changes to the low-acid canned food regulations, responding to questions
regarding the scope and details of the regulations.90 One issue regarded the applicability of the regulations
to foods with a water activity (aw) greater than 0.85, in which spore-forming microbes resistant to heating
could be inhibited through the control of water activity, the use of salt or other chemicals, or by innate
characteristics of the food itself. FDA, lacking scientiﬁc evidence as to the safety of such food processing,
declined to exempt such foods from the regulations for the time being.91 However, the Agency did propose
amendments to the regulations requiring the control of such “critical factors” as water activity in order to
ensure the safety of the food. 92 Another signiﬁcant proposed change involved a requirement that food
processors maintain a separate ﬁle of all manufacturing deviations where the “minimum requirements set
by the scheduled process”—i.e., the control limits—were not met.93 The stated purpose of the change was
to allow FDA and the manufacturer to readily identify any food product that may have been improperly
processed.94
Also in 1976, FDA decided to separately regulate “acidiﬁed foods,” which had previously been included in
the proposed low-acid food regulations.95 Acidiﬁed food includes vegetables, fruits, and other foods with a
water activity greater than 0.85 that are acidiﬁed at or below a pH of 4.6 in order to prevent the growth
of C. botulinum bacteria.96 Thus, acidiﬁed foods have a pH at or below 4.6, whereas low-acid foods have a
pH higher than 4.6. This regulatory distinction accounts for the fact that C. botulinum growth is inhibited
in acidic environments at or below a pH of 4.6; yet, FDA chose to regulate acidiﬁed foods in a manner
similar to low-acid foods, because improper control over the acidity in acidiﬁed foods could render them
83 Id. at 12717-18 (§§ 90.20(c)(1), (2)).
84 Id. at 12718. (§ 90.90(g)).
85 Id. at 12718. (§§ 90.90(d), (e)).
86 Id. at 12718. (§ 90.90(f)).
87 Id. at 12718. (§ 90.90(h)).
88 Id. at 12718. (§ 90.90(c)(3)(ii)).
89 38 Fed. Reg. at 20-21 (§§ 90.1-90.7).
90 Thermally Processed Low-Acid Foods Packaged in Hermetically Sealed Containers. Good Manufacturing Practice, 41
Fed. Reg. 30444 (July 23, 1976).
91 Id.
92 Id. at 30447 (proposed 128b.3(f)).
93 Id. At 30446, 30457 (proposed 128b.9).
94 Id. At 30446.
95 See id. at 30444.
96 See 21 C.F.R. § 114.3(b); the term “acidiﬁed foods” now includes pickled and fermented foods, whereas when the
regulations were ﬁrst proposed, such terms were separately deﬁned. See Pickled, Fermented, and Acidiﬁed Foods. Good
Manufacturing Practice, 41 Fed. Reg. 30457 (July 23, 1976).
18just as dangerous as improperly processed low-acid foods. FDA proposed that food processors implement
processing and recordkeeping controls similar to those for low-acid canned foods in order to ensure that
the ﬁnished equilibrium pH of acidiﬁed foods not exceed 4.6.97 Similarly, FDA proposed emergency permit
control regulations for acidiﬁed foods, analogous to those for low-acid foods.98
The emergency permit control regulations, including the general provisions (subpart A) and the provisions
speciﬁc to low-acid foods (subpart B), were ﬁnalized in 1977.99 These provisions are currently codiﬁed at
21 C.F.R. §§ 108.3-108.19 (general provisions) and 108.35 (low-acid foods). The emergency permit control
regulations for acidiﬁed foods (subpart B) were ﬁnalized in 1979, and are currently codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. §
108.25.100 Also in 1979, the FDA ﬁnalized its good manufacturing practice provisions for low-acid foods and
acidiﬁed foods.101 Those provisions are currently codiﬁed at 21 C.F.R. Parts 113 (low-acid foods) and 114
(acidiﬁed foods). Subsequent to the ﬁnalization of the regulations in 1977 and 1979, FDA has periodically
made minor revisions, but the core provisions deriving from the NCA petition remain intact.102
With all of the key regulatory provisions ﬁnalized, one can identify the essential features of a HACCP
plan. Take, for example, the regulations for low-acid foods. The hazard addressed by the regulations
is botulism. The critical factors in the manufacture of low-acid foods that the regulations seek to control
include pH (acidity), water activity, storage conditions (anaerobic atmosphere and ambient temperature) and
temperature (degree and time of heating necessary for commercial sterility).103 The critical control points
are those places in the manufacturing process where the critical factors can be controlled, which include the
retorts, the aseptic processing and packaging systems, and other systems that a manufacturer may use. The
regulations provide detailed requirements for the manufacturing equipment, mandating, e.g., that retorts
be equipped with mercury-in-glass thermometers, temperature-recording devices, pressure gages, and steam
controllers.104 The regulations also require control over the container ﬁlling and closure processes,105 as well
as the procurement of suitable raw materials.106
Because the low-acid food regulations nominally do not require HACCP compliance, they never mention
the term “critical limit.” Instead, the concept of critical limits is embodied within the requirement for a
“scheduled process” or HACCP-like plan that speciﬁes “the process selected by the processor as adequate
under the conditions of manufacture for a given product to achieve commercial sterility.”107 For example,
one such scheduled process is the “minimum thermal process”—i.e., the application of heat “for a period of
97 41 Fed. Reg. at 30460-61 (§§ 128g.7 and 128g.8).
98 Pickled, Fermented, and Acidiﬁed Foods. Emergency Permit Control, 41 Fed. Reg. 30442 (July 23, 1976).
99 Part 108—Emergency Permit Control, 42 Fed. Reg. 14334 (Mar. 15, 1977).
100 Part 108—Emergency Permit Control. Acidiﬁed Foods. Final Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 16204 (Mar. 16, 1979).
101 Part 113—Thermally Processed Low-Acid Foods Packaged in Hermetically Sealed Containers. Current Good Manufac-
turing Practice. Final Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 16209 (Mar. 16, 1979); Part 114—Acidiﬁed Foods. Current Good Manufacturing
Practice. Final Rule, 44 Fed. Reg. 16230 (Mar. 16, 1979).
102 The regulations, published in 21 C.F.R., note the “source” or Federal Register publication from which they are derived.
Please refer to the relevant provision in order to identify and locate amendments made subsequent to the publication of the
1977 and 1979 ﬁnal rules.
103 21 C.F.R. § 113.3(f) deﬁnes “critical factor” and § 113.3(e) deﬁnes “commercial sterility”. For a discussion of the critical
factors, see above text, or refer to 44 Fed. Reg. at 16209-10.
104 21 C.F.R. § 113.40(a)-(f); a retort is deﬁned as “any closed vessel or other equipment used for the thermal processing
of foods. 21 C.F.R. § 113.3(q).
105 21 C.F.R. §§ 113.60, 113.81(c), (d).
106 21 C.F.R. § 113.81(a).
107 21 C.F.R. § 133.3(r).
19time and at a temperature scientiﬁcally determined to be adequate to ensure destruction of microorganisms
of public health signiﬁcance.”108 This process must be “established by qualiﬁed persons having expert
knowledge of thermal processing requirements for low-acid foods in hermetically sealed containers and having
adequate facilities for making such determinations,” and must take into account the “type, range, and
combination of variations encountered in commercial production.”109 Furthermore, when addition of a
solute such as salt is required for the safe processing of low-acid foods, the critical limit of equilibrium water
activity of the ﬁnished product must be speciﬁed in the scheduled process devoted to water activity and
carefully controlled.110
As with HACCP plans, the low-acid food regulations require monitoring of the critical limits and docu-
mentation that critical variables in the manufacturing process have not exceeded their critical limits. As
noted above, food processors must install retorts equipped with thermometers and temperature recording
devices, allowing the temperature to be monitored. Processors must also employ inspectors, operating under
the supervision of trained individuals,111 to regularly observe container closures for gross closure defects.112
Containers must be coded to allow processors to track the manufacture and distribution of individual cans
throughout their entire lifecycle.113 An extensive list of parameters that must be monitored and documented
is provided at 21 C.F.R. § 113.100. Records pertaining to the establishment of the scheduled process and
incubation tests necessary to validate the process must be permanently retained.114 Other records must be
maintained for at least 3 years following the date of manufacture.115 Such records must be made available
to the FDA upon request for inspection and copying, pursuant to the emergency permit regulations.116
The low-acid food regulations, like HACCP, also require that deviations in processing or loss of control over
critical factors be documented and corrected, and that the corrections be documented.117 FDA requires food
processors to quarantine food manufactured by a potentially faulty process, and either reprocess the food,
destroy the food, or evaluate the food to ensure its safety for public consumption; when process deviations
exceed the critical limits (i.e., “the minimum requirements of the scheduled process”), food processors must
take corrective action.118 Sometimes, corrective action may entail a recall. The emergency permit regulations
require the food processor to “have prepared and in his ﬁles ...plans for eﬀective recalls of any product
that may be injurious to health; for identifying, collecting, warehousing, and controlling the product; for
determining the eﬀectiveness of such recall; for notifying [FDA] of any such recall; and for implementing
such recall program.”119
Importantly, the low-acid food regulations diﬀer from HACCP in the absence of an explicit requirement that
the scheduled processes or quality control system be periodically veriﬁed. Presumably, FDA could interpret
its existing regulations in such a manner as to include a veriﬁcation requirement; for example, the Agency
108 21 C.F.R. § 133.3(o).
109 21 C.F.R. § 113.83.
110 21 C.F.R. § 113.81(f).
111 21 C.F.R. § 113.10.
112 21 C.F.R. § 113.60(a).
113 21 C.F.R. §§ 113.60(c), §113.100.
114 21 C.F.R. § 113.83.
115 21 C.F.R. §§ 113.100(e), 108.35(h).
116 21 C.F.R. § 108.35(h).
117 21 C.F.R. § 113.89.
118 Id.
119 21 C.F.R. § 108.35(f).
20could require such veriﬁcation information as part of the scheduled processes that must be ﬁled shortly after
registration.120 Alternatively, FDA could informally require such veriﬁcation solely based on a threatened
imposition of the emergency permit requirement. Notwithstanding these creative solutions, however, the
regulations as promulgated currently do not impose a requirement that food processors routinely verify
their scheduled processes. This absence potentially renders the low-acid food regulations less eﬀective than
HACCP in preventing foodborne microbial illness, because it allows food processors to assume the continued
eﬃcacy and safety of their scheduled processes, without any validating scientiﬁc evidence to support that
assumption.
Part V
HACCP is a means of industry self-regulation enforced via a threat of government action should the industry
fail to regulate itself. The manufacturer identiﬁes the hazards speciﬁc to his operations and develops a quality
control plan suﬃcient to control those hazards. Should there be any indication that quality control is not
being maintained, the manufacturer evaluates the current quality control plan and makes any necessary
adjustments. Periodically, as a prophylactic measure, the manufacturer validates his quality control plan,
to ensure that his smoothly running manufacturing process meets his goal of producing safe, quality goods.
The manufacturer’s analysis of his manufacturing process and HACCP plan are guided by his speciﬁc needs
and goals, not by the speciﬁc mandates of regulators. The oversight of HACCP plans by regulators helps to
ensure that manufacturers take seriously their responsibilities to their consumers and the public at large.
The low-acid and acidiﬁed foods regulations, in contrast, do not represent industry self-regulation. The
FDA identiﬁed the relevant hazard (botulism) and crafted a series of regulations to prevent the occurrence
of this hazard, even going so far as to identify the critical factors and critical control points that food
processors must monitor and control. Given that the Agency possessed scientiﬁc evidence regarding how
pH, temperature, and water activity aﬀected the growth of C. botulinum in canned food, FDA’s decision to
mandate the control of these factors is entirely reasonable and appropriate.121 However, for foods for which
there are multiple potential hazards and multiple means of controlling those hazards, the promulgation of
regulations that adequately address regulators’ food safety concerns becomes much more diﬃcult. Not all
food processors will face the same hazards, and even if the hazards are the same, not all food processors
will be able to employ the same solution and still maintain suﬃcient quality of the ﬁnished food product.
Thus, where manufacturers of a certain category of food face diverse problems with respect to safety and
quality, a regulatory model that embraces industry self-regulation like HACCP seems more appropriate and
eﬃcient, when compared to a more deﬁned and circumscribed regulatory scheme as is found with low-acid
and acidiﬁed foods.
FDA learned this lesson the hard way with respect to its regulation of good manufacturing practices for
smoked ﬁsh. In 1969, the Agency proposed regulations in order to counter the threat of botulism associated
with smoked ﬁsh products, concerned that “some processors base their manufacturing processes solely upon
the appearance and acceptability of the ﬁnished product quality to consumers rather than on any speciﬁc or
120 21 C.F.R. § 108.35(c)(2).
121 See, e.g., Food and Drug Administration, Foodborne Pathogenic Microorganisms and Natural Toxins Handbook. Factors
Aﬀecting the Growth of Some Foodborne Pathogens. Online at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼mow/factors.html.
21controlled processing parameters” that would minimize the production of botulism toxin.122 The proposed
rule required that smoked ﬁsh contain at least 3.5% salt, and be heated at 180◦F or higher for at least
30 minutes, regardless of the species of ﬁsh being processed.123 The Bureau of Commercial Fisheries,
Department of the Interior, opposed the proposed rule on the basis that adequate time, temperature and
salinity concentrations necessary to prevent botulism had not been determined for the various individual
species of ﬁsh.124 The Bureau’s concern was that a one-size-ﬁts-all approach would subject some smoked
ﬁsh products to over-processing, harming the quality of the ﬁnal product. The FDA, in its ﬁnal rule for
smoked ﬁsh, granted ﬁsh processors another option of increasing the smoked ﬁsh’s salinity to 5.0%, and
decreasing the temperature to 150◦F (for 30 minutes), but otherwise allowed no variation from the two
“TTS” (time-temperature-salinity) options.125
FDA rationalized that given the threat of botulism and the knowledge that certain TTS combinations suﬃced
to prevent botulism, it should err on the side of caution and apply its TTS requirements to all species of
ﬁsh.126 In the preamble to the proposed rule, FDA pledged that it would be receptive to scientiﬁc data that
demonstrated alternate means of processing for any individual species of ﬁsh.127 However, any individual
food processor had little incentive to shoulder the costs of developing such species-speciﬁc scientiﬁc data
and providing it to FDA, when all of its competitors could “free-ride” oﬀ of the information. Accordingly,
some manufacturers of smoked ﬁsh simply implemented what they believed to be eﬀective quality control
measures and refused to comply with the regulations.
This brings us to the celebrated administrative law case of U.S. v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp.128
Nova Scotia Food Products Corp. (“Nova Scotia”), a processor of smoked whiteﬁsh, did not comply with
the TTS regulations, claiming that to do so would result in an unmarketable product. Nova Scotia defended
its actions upon the grounds that the regulations were invalid because (1) the regulations exceeded FDA’s
delegated authority; (2) FDA relied upon undisclosed scientiﬁc data in promulgating the regulations, such
that its decision to adopt the regulations was unsupported by the administrative record; and (3) there was
no adequate statement setting forth the basis of its regulation, as required by the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).129
The court rejected Nova Scotia’s ﬁrst argument, ﬁnding within the Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act §
402(a)(4) suﬃcient authority to regulate microbial food hazards. Nova Scotia argued that the § 402(a)(4)
prohibition against “food held under insanitary conditions whereby it may have become contaminated with
ﬁlth” applied only to insanitary conditions in the manufacturing plant itself (i.e., “ﬁlth”); Nova Scotia
contended that FDA’s regulation of microbial contamination endemic to the food product itself must proceed
pursuant to the emergency permit provisions of § 404 in order to be a valid exercise of delegated authority.130
The court, disregarding the plain language of § 402(a)(4) in favor of the Act’s legislative purpose of protecting
122 Human Foods; Current Good Manufacturing Practice (Sanitation) in Manufacturing, Processing, Packaging or Holding.
Smoked Fish, 34 Fed. Reg. 17176, 17177 (Oct. 23, 1969).
123 Id. (§128a.1(d)); Id. at 17178 (§128a.7(d)(2)).
124 Id. at 17176.
125 Part 128a—Fish and Seafood Products. Subpart A—Smoked and Smoke-Flavored Fish, 35 Fed. Reg 17401, 17402
(Nov. 13, 1970) (see § 128a.7(d)(2)).
126 Id. at 17401.
127 34 Fed. Reg. at 17177.
128 568 F.2d 240 (2nd Cir. 1977).
129 Id. at 243.
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22public health, rejected the argument, noting that invalidation of the TTS regulations in this manner would
require the invalidation of numerous regulations aimed at preventing microbial contamination of food.131
With respect to Nova Scotia’s second and third arguments, the court agreed with the whiteﬁsh processor
that failures in the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures doomed the regulation. FDA did not keep
a contemporaneous record consisting of data on which the Agency’s decision-making was based; rather,
after the Nova Scotia court proceedings commenced, FDA created a record consisting of comments received
during the rulemaking process and scientiﬁc data the Commissioner claimed that he relied upon, but which
were not disclosed to the public.132 The court ruled that the lack of public disclosure of the scientiﬁc data
denied interested parties of their opportunity to make meaningful comments; for without access to the data
underlying the agency’s actions, interested parties cannot make comments that are likely to persuade the
Agency.133 In other words, FDA’s actions rendered ineﬀective the “comment” portion of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Furthermore, the court ruled that FDA failed to adequately state its basis and purpose of the
TTS regulations by not addressing manufacturers’ concerns that the regulations, as proposed, would render
certain species of ﬁsh unmarketable.134 Allowing such vital concerns to go unaddressed would promote,
rather than prevent, arbitrary decision-making.
The Nova Scotia opinion is notable for the extent to which the court’s decision appears to be inﬂuenced by
its opinion of the administrative agency’s policy decision. The court explicitly framed the procedural issues
in the light of three key issues: “(1) whether, in the light of the rather scant history of botulism in whiteﬁsh,
that species should have been considered separately rather than included in a general regulation which
failed to distinguish species from species; (2) whether the application of the proposed T-T-S requirements to
smoked whiteﬁsh made the whiteﬁsh commercially unsaleable; and (3) whether the agency recognized that
prospect, but nevertheless decided that the public health needs should prevail even if that meant commercial
death for the whiteﬁsh industry.”135 The court, contemplating these issues, concluded that FDA’s response
to the threat of botulism required a more nuanced approach than the imposition of one of two TTS schemes,
either of which would render otherwise safe food unmarketable. The court wrote, “It is easy enough for an
administrator to ban everything. In the regulation of food processing, the worldwide need for food also must
be taken into account in formulating measures taken for the protection of health. In the light of the history
of smoked whiteﬁsh to which we have referred, we ﬁnd no articulate balancing here suﬃcient to make the
procedure followed less than arbitrary.”136
Thus, the court invalidated the TTS regulations on procedural grounds and, arguably, also on policy grounds.
Following the Nova Scotia decision, FDA ceased enforcement of the regulations.137 In 1983, FDA proposed
a revocation of the TTS regulations, announcing that it was in the process of “developing data to support
minimum T-T-S requirements”, a project that “will take considerable time to complete.”138 The Agency
decided for the time being to undertake the lengthy and complicated task of compiling TTS requirements
on a species-by-species basis. Given the obvious costs of this method of regulation, the choice of HACCP
131 Id. at 246-48.
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23and industry self-regulation became increasingly attractive.
Part VI
In 1988, Congress appropriated funds to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of
the Department of Commerce for the purpose of studying the implementation of a HACCP certiﬁcation and
seafood surveillance program. The National Marines Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) of NOAA subsequently
recruited the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) to conduct the study.139 The
IOM report concluded that the diverse health risks associated with seafood best could be controlled through
a regulatory system that addressed the various hazards on a geographically-restricted and/or species-speciﬁc
basis, foregoing the “one size ﬁts all” approach of the withdrawn TTS regulations. The authors wrote,
“[T]his will require something other than organoleptically based inspection systems [e.g., visual inspection
systems], which may be useful for quality control and grading but are essentially worthless for detecting
and controlling health risks.”140 Later, the authors concluded, “Postharvest control seems likely to be most
readily achieved through an HACCP-based system focusing on cross-contamination, temperature control,
and the eﬀectiveness of handling and processing methods designed to inhibit or destroy microorganisms.”141
Years later, the FDA accepted the conclusion of the IOM and adopted HACCP as a regulatory tool to ensure
the safety of ﬁsh and ﬁsh products. On January 28, 1994, FDA published its proposed HACCP seafood
rule.142 The ﬁnal rule issued on December 18, 1995, with an eﬀective date of 2 years from publication,
December 18, 1997.143 FDA’s reasons for adopting a HACCP regulatory system were varied and numerous,
but perhaps none were as important as the lessons learned from the Nova Scotia case and its aftermath.
That case brought to the forefront the diﬃculties inherent in the regulation of seafood—in particular the
need for the FDA to craft individualized regulations that recognize and account for the broad variation
inherent in the category of seafood. After Nova Scotia, it became clear that the courts would not allow the
Agency to promulgate generally applicable seafood regulations, given the diversity among diﬀerent types of
seafood, their environments, and the hazards aﬀecting the seafood eﬀectively prohibited.
Thus, Nova Scotia placed an enormous burden on FDA, requiring the Agency in its regulations either
to address individually the various hazards aﬀecting seafood, or not to address the hazards at all. For
concerned government oﬃcials, inaction was not an option, not only for the obvious public health reasons,
but also for the economic reasons of shoring up consumer conﬁdence in the safety and quality of seafood.144
Perhaps inaction would have been a viable option had FDA’s existing regulatory framework been able to
adequately protect consumers. However, FDA had been relying primarily upon periodic plant inspections
and end-product testing as a means to ensure safety.145 The Institute of Medicine reviewed FDA’s sampling
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24procedures and found that they provided “relatively little protection to the public.”146 The day-to-day
realities of the seafood industry make lot sampling an imprecise and unreliable tool. The United States
consumes a large volume of seafood, with over half of the seafood being imported from diverse regions of
the world. As a result, an eﬀective inspection-based system would require large sample sizes and diverse
sampling plans to account for the various seafood species and hazards, requirements which could not be met
with FDA’s limited resources.147
Furthermore, FDA’s inspection-based system employed testing that was destructive and very lengthy in
nature. In other words, the testing often required the destruction of the sample seafood product, and
laboratory evaluations might only be completed after the lot from which the sample originated had been
eaten by consumers.148 These disadvantages stemmed from the “reactive” regulatory posture of the FDA.149
FDA did not provide the seafood industry with guidelines and warnings suﬃcient to prevent the occurrence
of hazards in seafood. Instead, the Agency relied upon an inspection scheme to prevent already hazardous
food from reaching the public. Should hazardous food reach the public, consumers likely would be without
recourse, facing diﬃculty in tracing any resultant illness to seafood and to the particular ﬁrm that processed
the hazardous seafood. FDA explained:
“The seafood industry diﬀers from a large part of the food industry in that, except for certain
branded ﬁsh products, almost all fresh and a large portion of frozen seafood is sold to the public
unbranded or under brands that are not widely advertised and not generally recognized. Often, when
ﬁsh or shellﬁsh is oﬀered for sale by a supermarket or restaurant, that product has been sourced
from several suppliers in order to obtain a large enough quantity to meet consumer demand. Each
supplier, in turn, may source from several processors for much the same reason. Likewise, each
processor may receive raw material from several harvesters and possibly import it from one or more
countries. For these reasons, these products lose their source identity and are marketed generically
(exceptions being canned, frozen, and branded seafood). This subsequently makes it diﬃcult for a
supermarket or restaurant to discern the source of the product involved in a consumer complaint. As
a result, some ﬁrms may not be adequately motivated to provide suﬃcient levels of safety. Thus, it
may be argued that, for the most part, the tort system does not adequately compensate consumers
for illnesses derived from the consumption of seafood.”150
Clearly, federal regulators believed that the pre-existing inspection system coupled with the tort system
proved inadequate to deter regulatory violations, ensure the safety of consumers, and build consumer con-
ﬁdence in seafood products. Thus, regulatory inaction—an unfortunate by-product of the Nova Scotia
decision—could not be continued indeﬁnitely. However, the remaining option left open to FDA by Nova Scotia—
species-speciﬁc and/or geographic region-speciﬁc regulations—raised the specter that the Agency could be
bogged down interminably by the complexities of aquatic life. That FDA understood the magnitude of this
potential regulatory burden is evident from the HACCP proposed rule. FDA wrote:
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25“Ensuring the safety of seafood presents special challenges to both the industry that produces
it and to Government agencies charged with protecting the public health. Seafood is unique in
many respects. While often thought of as homogeneous in nature, seafood is actually a variety of
products encompassing literally hundreds of species that have little in common other than an aquatic
origin. Collectively, seafoods have perhaps the most diverse and complex microbiology of any food
commodity.
“The range of habitats for edible species is also extraordinary and diverse ranging from cold to warm
water, bottom dwelling to surface feeding, deep sea to near shore, and fresh water to saltwater. Fish
are exposed to the bacteria and viruses that naturally occur in their environment as well as to
those that enter the water through pollution. Chemicals, some of which are toxic to humans, can
accumulate in ﬁsh as well. Fish can also accumulate natural toxins and parasites that are speciﬁc to
marine animals. As a consequence, ﬁsh are subject to a wide range of hazards before harvest.”151
Microbial contamination, environmental pollution, bioaccumulation of toxins, hundreds of seafood species
with diverse biological characteristics—if FDA were to promulgate TTS (or similar) regulations, it would
need to account for all of these factors. With this in mind, one can understand why HACCP was such an
attractive regulatory option for the Agency. HACCP shifts the burden of identifying and controlling for the
numerous seafood hazards from the government to industry. HACCP makes seafood processors responsible
for understanding the biology of the species being harvested, processed and sold, and using that information
to establish sanitary procedures for delivering seafood from the aquatic environment to consumers.
The documentation and recordkeeping provisions of HACCP also decrease the burden on FDA’s inspection
resources. HACCP replaces the “snapshot” inspections of the previous regulatory regime with a cumulative
view of the processor’s operations over time, as revealed by the processor’s records. Thus, under HACCP,
the daily burden of inspecting the cleanliness and eﬀectiveness of the manufacturing system is shifted to
the seafood processor, whereas FDA merely inspects the processor’s inspection process. As a result, FDA’s
inspection actions become more eﬀective and eﬃcient, focusing upon the processor’s handling of critical
control points—the steps at which hazards can best be controlled—over a long period of time. Faced with
limited resources, the Agency can henceforth utilize its inspection resources in a cost-eﬀective manner,
targeting the most serious hazards ﬁrst for inspection.152
Conceptually, HACCP shifts the burden placed on FDA by the Nova Scotia decision from the Agency to
private industry. In practice, however, the shift is only partial. After all, how could FDA properly review a
HACCP plan and oversee compliance with that plan if it remained ignorant of the various hazards aﬀecting
seafood? If FDA did not educate the seafood processors as to the potential hazards, how could the Agency
ensure that ignorant processors were not simply declaring their products hazard free and shipping potentially
hazardous food to consumers? Therefore, FDA does compile information regarding the potential hazards for
various types of seafood and does provide this information to industry. FDA guidance documents identify
potential hazards and provide recommendations for controlling such hazards.153 However, industry bears the
ﬁnal responsibility for ensuring that hazards are identiﬁed and controlled for in an appropriate manner.154
152 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 65104 (FDA’s response to comment 14).
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26Therefore, HACCP represents a system of industry self-regulation encompassed within a larger federal reg-
ulatory framework. In this regard, HACCP also represents an innovation over past methods of hazard
regulation. Unlike the low-acid canned foods regulations discussed above, the HACCP regulations dictate
no criteria or parameters that food processors must meet in order to be in compliance with good manu-
facturing practices. There are no speciﬁc regulations regarding minimum temperature settings, machinery
speciﬁcations, retorts, pressure gauges, or temperature-recording devices—only a method or set of guidelines
that must be followed in order to ensure food safety.
Part VII
HACCP properly should be characterized as a method of regulation, rather than as a body of regulations.
It represents a commitment to the statistical quality control methods described by Shewhart and Deming
decades ago, and eagerly adopted by post-war Japanese manufacturers. Thus, beyond the advantages already
discussed, the seafood HACCP program confers upon ﬁrms the eﬃciency and economic beneﬁts derived from
statistical quality control.
In particular, HACCP oﬀers seafood processors a comprehensive system from which to operate their busi-
nesses. This feature mitigates the costs associated with knowledge of and compliance with complex regula-
tions promulgated by multiple regulatory bodies. Indeed, the regulation of seafood can only be described
as divided and fractured. The FDA plays the primary role in establishing and enforcing regulatory limits
for seafood, in order to ensure seafood product safety. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) assists
FDA by identifying the range of harmful residual chemical contaminants that are likely to accumulate in
seafood.155 FDA also coordinates the National Shellﬁsh Sanitation Program (NSSP), a voluntary program
comprised of federal oﬃcials (e.g., FDA), state agencies, and private industry. Under NSSP, federal, state
and private parties work together to establish a uniform body of guidelines and standards regarding shellﬁsh
to be enforced by state regulatory agencies. FDA bears responsibility for setting the standards and ensuring
state compliance with the NSSP standards.156 Furthermore, the National Marines Fisheries Service (NMFS)
provides a voluntary (fee-for-service) seafood inspection program, which surveys ﬁrms’ compliance with ap-
plicable federal regulations and certiﬁes ﬁrms’ use of oﬃcial marks such as “U.S. Grade A” and “Processed
Under Federal Inspection (PUFI)”.157 NMFS used to run a voluntary HACCP certiﬁcation program, but
with FDA’s adoption of seafood HACCP regulations, NMFS converted this program into one that helps
companies comply with HACCP.158
HACCP has not eliminated the fractionated regulation of seafood, (although it has rendered the NMFS
voluntary program redundant). But HACCP does provide an overarching concept under which one can
integrate these diverse aspects of seafood regulation. For example, a food processor must identify within
its HACCP plan food safety hazards that are “reasonably likely to occur”, including environmental factors
such as natural toxins, chemical contaminants, and pesticides.159 Furthermore, HACCP plans must be
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27speciﬁc to each kind of seafood product processed, including shellﬁsh.160 The HACCP seafood regulations
include, as an “augmentation” to the general HAACP regulations, a subpart speciﬁc to the processing of
molluscan shellﬁsh “where such processing does not include a treatment that ensures the destruction of
vegetative cells of microorganisms of public health concern.”161 This special subpart refers to the types of
activities regulated by states under the NSSP. The NSSP’s “Model Ordinance”—the minimum requirements
states must meet in regulating interstate commerce of molluscan shellﬁsh—requires shellﬁsh dealers to adopt
HACCP plans.162 Thus, the regulatory ﬂexibility encompassed within the HACCP concept allows for a
streamlining and uniﬁcation of federal regulation.
Another beneﬁt of HACCP is the ability of the United States to harmonize its seafood regulations with those
of other countries. The 1995 ﬁnal rule noted that, at that time, Canada had already implemented a HACCP
system, and the EU had issued directives moving towards a HACCP system.163 In a 1998 report written in
association with the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, the author noted:
“The use of HACCP in the seafood industry has taken on a global perspective in the production of
ﬁsh and ﬁshery products (Lima dos Santos and Sophonphong 1998). They report the results of an
FAO survey that categorized the status of countries and the seafood industries in those countries in
adopting seafood HACCP procedures. Countries whose governments and seafood industries which
have adopted or decided to introduce seafood HACCP include Canada, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Iceland, United States and more recently Argentina,
Peru, Ireland, Cuba, Morocco, Norway, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Bangladesh. A second group consists
of countries whose governments have taken unilateral initiatives to introduce HACCP via regulations
with limited success and cooperation between the regulatory authorities and the seafood industry.
These countries include Mexico, Venezuela, and many member countries of the European Union,
for example Italy, Germany and France. In a third group of countries, the private sector is taking
the lead in voluntarily trying to introduce HACCP-based programmes regarding seafood export
production. These include Madagascar, Venezuela, Honduras, Tunisia, Myanmar and Portugal. A
ﬁnal group consists of countries where governments have decided to apply HACCP but have not yet
deﬁned the process, including Japan, Russia and China. Remaining countries where the status of
seafood HACCP is unclear include Pakistan, South Korea, Iran, Colombia, Panama, some East and
Central European countries and most African States.”164
Although the details of the various countries’ HACCP regulations may vary, the fact that so many countries
have gravitated towards a similar system signiﬁcantly reduces the compliance costs of seafood processors
that import their food to multiple nations. HACCP may operate, therefore, as a mechanism to encourage
free trade between nations that have adopted the system, and as a trade barrier to those nations with less
strict standards.165 Furthermore, for U.S. companies that export seafood products to other countries with
HACCP requirements, a mandatory U.S. HACCP requirement allows these companies to maintain their
market share in foreign markets.166
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28Part VIII
As the preceding sections of this paper have demonstrated, the adoption of HACCP and HACCP-like systems
beneﬁts manufacturers, regulatory agencies, and consumers. However, HACCP is not problem-free. HACCP
may signiﬁcantly reduce the regulatory burden on federal regulatory agencies, but this reduction occurs at
the expense of the regulated industry. Many of those who commented on the seafood ﬁnal rule argued that
compliance costs would make business unproﬁtable for small seafood processors, especially in the case of
“economically-strapped, old family enterprises that support an often fragile local economy.”167 Whereas it
might be relatively cheap to monitor critical control points and properly document critical measurements,
the costs to businesses of informing themselves of the various hazards applicable to their seafood products,
developing an adequate HACCP plan, and training their employees could prove to be quite substantial. FDA
acknowledged these costs, but determined that they were necessary if the public health protection purpose of
the HACCP rules was to be fully implemented and respected. The Agency noted that its guidance documents,
in conjunction with HACCP programs established by trade associations and other organizations, would serve
to signiﬁcantly reduce costs to small businesses.168
One potential consequence of the costs and other diﬃculties (perceived or actual) in transitioning to a
HACCP quality control system is a conscious decision by seafood processors simply not to comply with
HACCP, or to only make minor changes when major changes are needed. Alternatively, such processors may
attempt to comply with HACCP, but ﬁnd themselves ﬁnancially unable to do so or unaware of all the material
hazards and remedial controls aﬀecting their seafood products. The ultimate result of these scenarios would
be noncompliance with the regulations. Indeed, FDA’s compilation of data regarding HACCP compliance
indicates a signiﬁcant lack of compliance among seafood processors. FDA data for ﬁscal year 2003 indicates
that 18% of the inspected domestic ﬁrms and 33% of inspected foreign ﬁrms that needed a HACCP plan
did not have one. Furthermore, of ﬁrms with plans, substantial numbers failed to adequately identify within
their plans all relevant hazards (13% domestic, 27% foreign), critical control points (14% domestic, 27%
foreign), critical limits (18% domestic, 40% foreign), monitoring procedures (21% domestic, 36% foreign),
and corrective actions (11% domestic, 18% foreign). Also, many ﬁrms failed to adequately implement HACCP
monitoring procedures (24% domestic, 29% foreign) and keep adequate monitoring records (27% domestic,
44% foreign).169 These numbers suggest that the informational and ﬁnancial burdens imposed on industry
by HACCP detract are quite diﬃcult for some ﬁrms to meet, resulting in substantial noncompliance.
The data also illustrate a basic problem with industry self-regulation, namely that certain industry members
might fail to adequately regulate themselves, for one reason or another. Of course, noncompliance is a
problem that accompanies any regulatory system. However, one issue speciﬁc to the seafood HACCP system
is whether ﬁrms have enough scientiﬁc expertise or enough accessibility to such expertise in order to identify
and control for all relevant hazards. FDA’s data suggests that the information costs with respect to seafood
quality control and food safety may be too great a burden for a substantial portion of seafood ﬁrms, such
that self-regulation through HACCP may not be an eﬀective regulatory model for these less sophisticated
ﬁrms. Yet, some would argue that perhaps the most beneﬁcial feature of HACCP is its mandate that food
processors gain the sophistication needed to produce a safe food product, and that food processors, not
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168 60 Fed. Reg. at 65106-07.
169 Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Evaluation of the Seafood HACCP Program for Fiscal Years 2002/2003. Online
at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼comm/seaeval3.html.
29government, bear the responsibility for ensuring food safety.
Although HACCP purports to shift the regulatory burden to industry, substantial levels of industry non-
compliance eﬀectively shifts part of that burden back to FDA. After all, if signiﬁcant numbers of seafood
processors fail to meet federal safety standards, the Agency must increase, or at least adapt, its oversight
and enforcement procedures in order to ensure a safe food supply. The implementation of HACCP itself
also resulted in increased burdens on FDA. In the long term, HACCP was expected to reduce federal reg-
ulatory costs; but in the short term, FDA had to radically shifts its regulatory approach, issue regulations
and guidance, and retrain its inspection and enforcement personnel. Substantial deﬁciencies in the Agency’s
actions could jeopardize the gains to be realized through HACCP. Indeed, in a January 2001 report, the
Government Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) reviewed FDA’s implementation of HACCP, addressing numerous
issues that undermine the system’s eﬀectiveness.170 The report, provocatively entitled “Federal Oversight
of Seafood Does Not Suﬃciently Protect Consumers,” suggests that FDA itself was ill-equipped to handle
the administrative and regulatory burdens necessary for eﬀective implementation of the seafood HACCP
regulations.
One of the major problems identiﬁed by GAO was FDA’s inability to adequately monitor the safety of
imported seafood products which, in 1999, totaled an estimated 3.9 billion pounds of food.171 Pursuant to
the HACCP regulations, importers have the burden of ensuring that the seafood they import is safe and
processed in compliance with a suitable HACCP plan.172 Yet, the easiest way for an importer to meet that
burden—obtaining the seafood from a country certiﬁed by FDA as having a compliance system equivalent
to the U.S. system—had been foreclosed by FDA’s inability to enter into an agreement or memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with other countries certifying their compliance systems.173 Consequently, importers
were left with the task of acquiring documentation of aﬃrmative steps taken by foreign seafood processors
to ensure the safety of their seafood, a task at which most importers did not or could not succeed.174 GAO
found FDA’s inspections at foreign plants and ports of entry, as well as FDA’s enforcement actions against
noncompliant ﬁrms, to be wholly inadequate to compensate for importers’ failure to verify the safety of their
imports.175
GAO found that another feature of the HACCP regulations prohibited FDA from eﬀectively monitoring
seafood processors’ compliance. Unlike the low-acid canned food regulations, the HACCP regulations con-
tain no requirement that seafood processors register with FDA. Without such a provision, the Agency
resorted to identifying ﬁrms through such costly methods as the yellow pages, the trade press, and consumer
complaints.176 Consequently, FDA had no accurate record of the number of ﬁrms subject to the HACCP
rule, nor did it have any cost-eﬀective method of obtaining such records. Any number of ﬁrms simply escaped
from federal oversight of their seafood operations.
Another major problem identiﬁed by GAO was the presence of certain gaps in the HACCP regulations,
deliberately introduced by FDA in order to decrease its regulatory burden. For instance, FDA exempted
170 Government Accounting Oﬃce, Federal Oversight of Seafood Does Not Suﬃciently Protect Consumers (January 2001).
Online at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01204.pdf.
171 Id. at 8.
172 21 C.F.R. § 123.3(g)
173 See 21 C.F.R. § 123.12(a)(1); Government Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 170, at 24.
174 See 21 C.F.R. § 123.12(a)(2); Government Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 170, at 26-29.
175 Government Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 170, at 30-31.
176 Id. at 14.
30ﬁshing vessels, carriers and retailers from the HACCP regulations by excluding them from the deﬁnition of
“processor.” 177 FDA noted that the activities of these ﬁrms properly could be characterized as “processing”,
but that the relatively low risk of hazards inherent in their activities did not warrant the enormous regulatory
costs of ensuring their compliance with the HACCP rule. Speciﬁcally, the Agency reasoned that “the large
size of the U.S. ﬁshing ﬂeet and the large numbers of carriers and retailers would overwhelm any rational
Federal inspection system.”178 GAO disagreed with FDA’s conclusions, warning that hazards could arise
through the improper harvesting, transporting, “heading”, gutting, and freezing of ﬁsh aboard ﬁshing vessels,
as well as through improper temperature control at warehouses and storage facilities; the potential public
health consequences warranted, in GAO’s opinion, that the currently exempt ﬁrms be required to adopt
HACCP plans.179
Thus, the transition to HACCP left both the regulator and the regulated entity with burdens that each was
unable to fully meet. Yet, despite these setbacks, the federal government remained steadfast in its devotion
to HACCP as a regulatory tool. GAO did not call for a retreat from HACCP, but rather for “stronger
implementation” of the system.180 FDA responded by issuing a “mid-course correction” in order to address
some of the weaknesses pointed out in the GAO report.181 Any short-term failures would not be appropriated
by the Agency to derail the perceived long-term beneﬁts of HACCP.
Part IX
Despite the diﬃculties in transitioning over to a HACCP system of regulation, the Agency continued to view
HACCP with favor compared to alternative regulatory options. FDA proposed HACCP regulations for juice
in 1998. The proposal was prompted, in part, by a series of high-proﬁle cases of microbial contamination—in
particular, a 1996 outbreak of E. coli in unpasteurized apple juice that resulted in the death of a child.182
The proposed regulations revealed other potential hazards that were concerning the Agency, including the
presence of pesticides and contaminants from soil, cans, and the manufacturing process in juice products.183
Over protests from industry, FDA adopted the juice HACCP regulations in 2001, declining to adopt more
limited regulatory options such as increased inspections, new GMP regulations, mandatory pasteurization,
better labeling, or increased industry education.184 With juice, the Agency did not face the variety and
complexity encountered with seafood production. FDA could have addressed the problem of microbial
contamination by mandating heat treatment or pasteurization of juice products. Likewise, FDA could
177 60 Fed. Reg. at 65112.
178 Id.
179 Government Accounting Oﬃce, supra note 170, at 14-16.
180 Id. at 7.
181 Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Seafood HACCP Program: Mid-Course Correction (Feb. 13, 2001). Online at
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/∼comm/shaccp1.html. FDA’s plan called for improvements in inspection, enforcement and guidance
to industry; but the Agency did not amend its regulations to include within their scope ﬁshing vessels, carriers and retailers,
nor has it amended the regulations to address any of GAO’s other concerns.
182 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing
of Juice; Food Labeling: Warning Notice Statements; Labeling of Juice Products; Proposed Rules, 63 Fed. Reg. 20449, 20450,
20452 (April 24, 1998).
183 Id. at 20451-52.
184 Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP); Procedures for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing
of Juice; Final Rule, 66 Fed. Reg. 6137, 6140 (January 19, 2001).
31have collaborated with the Environmental Protection Agency to address concerns about environmental
contaminants and pesticides. So why did FDA choose HACCP?
The answer lies in HACCP’s ﬂexibility. HACCP allows food processors and regulators to target their limited
resources towards those concerns or critical control points most likely to aﬀect the safety and quality of the
ﬁnished juice product. The juice HACCP ﬁnal rule elaborates on these beneﬁts:
“Flexibility in how to address identiﬁed hazards is inherent in HACCP systems. Even when produc-
ing comparable products, no two processors use the same source of incoming materials or the same
processing technique, or manufacture in identical facilities. Each of these factors (and their many
combinations) presents potential opportunities for contamination of the food. HACCP focuses the
processor on understanding his own process and the hazards that may be introduced during that
process, and identifying speciﬁc controls to prevent, reduce, or eliminate the identiﬁed hazards.
“The ﬂexibility of the HACCP approach is a critically important attribute. This ﬂexibility allows
manufacturers to adjust CCP’s, adjust techniques used to address CCP’s when changes occur in
the system (e.g., use of new ingredients), and readily incorporate new scientiﬁc developments (e.g.,
use of new control techniques, new preventive technologies, identiﬁcation of new hazards). Another
important strength of HACCP is the development of a plan written by the processor detailing the
control measures to be used at CCP’s. By developing a written plan, juice processors gain a work-
ing knowledge of their processing system, its eﬀect on the food, and where in the system potential
contamination may occur. Both the processor and the agency are able to derive the full beneﬁts of
a HACCP system. The hazard analysis and HACCP plan allow both the processor and the agency
to verify and validate the operation of the system. HACCP’s ﬂexibility also permits processors to
select the appropriate control measures in the context of how the whole system functions, allowing
processors to use the most appropriate and economical methods to control food hazards that are
reasonably likely to occur in their operation. The ability to choose among various control meth-
ods encourages research on and development of new and innovative technologies to better address
individual situations.”185
The ﬂexibility of HACCP individualizes the approach manufacturers take towards ensuring food safety
and quality, as well as the approach FDA takes towards each manufacturer’s HACCP plan. The freedom
inherent in this system allows manufacturers to experiment with new quality control methods, rather than
simply adjusting their methods to comply with those speciﬁed by detailed regulations.186 Experimentation
is further encouraged through HACCP’s veriﬁcation requirement. Because food processors’ HACCP plans
must periodically be re-evaluated and veriﬁed, HACCP forces food processors and regulators to continuously
inform themselves regarding the latest advances in the ﬁelds of food science and technology.187 With current
scientiﬁc and technical information at their ﬁngertips, food processors are better able to create safer and
more eﬃcient quality control systems through experimentation.
Therefore, to paraphrase Justice Brandeis, HACCP allows the single courageous manufacturer to serve as a
laboratory and try novel experiments.188 At worst, the experimentation may only harm the manufacturer
186 The low-acid canned foods regulations with their detailed descriptions of proper retort equipment serve as an example
of an inﬂexible regulatory scheme.
187 66 Fed. Reg. at 6141.
188 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy
32who invested time and money into a failed experiment; but at best, the single manufacturer may produce
an innovation that may ultimately spread through the industry and beneﬁt all manufacturers. By focusing
manufacturers’ attention on the production process rather than on the end product, and by requiring manu-
facturers to verse themselves in the latest scientiﬁc knowledge, HACCP provides the groundwork from which
manufacturers can then build upon to improve their quality control systems. Thus, in a regulated industry,
HACCP serves as an engine driving innovation.
FDA believed that this engine would drive innovation even among small businesses, which often bear the
greatest burden in transitioning over to HACCP. FDA acknowledged that small businesses’ “complete un-
derstanding of what constitutes full implementation of a HACCP system [may not be] immediate,” but
nevertheless believed that small processors could and should be able to master the HACCP concept.189
Through HACCP, small business would beneﬁt from the forced self-education on science-based analysis and
control of juice hazards, allowing them to improve the quality and safety of their products.
Part X
Despite FDA’s enthusiasm for the dynamic and ﬂexible HACCP system, industry has not always been
so receptive to the idea. A recent example involves current good manufacturing practices (CGMPs) for
dietary supplements. FDA suggested that HACCP might be an appropriate regulatory approach to dietary
supplement CGMPs; the Agency noted, “[B]ecause of the wide variety of dietary ingredients and dietary
supplements and because of the heterogeneous composition of the dietary supplement industry, CGMPs
based on HACCP principles may provide a more ﬂexible and less burdensome regulatory framework for
manufacturers and distributors than the approach set out in the industry submission.”190 Yet, comments
from industry revealed widespread opposition to HACCP, prompting FDA to abandon any plans to institute
a formal HACCP requirement for dietary supplement manufacturing.191
At face value, FDA’s decision to propose traditional CGMP requirements for dietary supplement suggests a
defeat for the HACCP concept; it also suggests that future application of HACCP may be restricted only to
certain categories of high-risk foods such as seafood and juice. However, FDA’s decision to forego a formal
HACCP requirement does not preclude the possibility of HACCP concepts comprising a substantial portion
of the proposed CGMP regulations. Indeed, a closer look at the proposed dietary supplement CGMP
regulations indicates that FDA has not retracted its support for HACCP. Take, for example, proposed
regulation 111.45:192
Sec. 111.45 What requirements apply to establishing a master manufacturing record?
(a) You must prepare and follow a written master manufacturing record for each type of dietary
ingredient or dietary supplement that you manufacture and for each batch size to ensure uniformity
from batch to batch. The master manufacturing record must:
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”)
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33(1) Identify speciﬁcations for the points, steps, or stages in the manufacturing process where
control is necessary to prevent adulteration; and
(2) Establish controls and procedures to ensure that each batch of dietary ingredient or dietary
supplement manufactured meets those speciﬁcations.
(b) The master manufacturing record must include the following information:
***
(8) Written instructions including, but not limited to, the following:
(i) Speciﬁcations for each point, step, or stage in manufacturing the dietary ingredient or
dietary supplement necessary to prevent adulteration;
(ii) Sampling and testing procedures;
(iii) Speciﬁc actions necessary to perform and verify points, steps, or stages, necessary to
meet speciﬁcations and otherwise prevent adulteration, including, but not limited to, one
person weighing or measuring a component and another person verifying the weight or
measure and one person adding the component and another person verifying the addition;
(iv) Special notations and precautions to be followed; and
(v) Corrective action plans for use when a speciﬁcation is not met.
(c) You must have the quality control unit review and approve each master manufacturing record
and any modiﬁcations to a master manufacturing record.
(d) You must keep master manufacturing records in accordance with Sec. 111.125 [which requires
ﬁrms to keep records for 3 years, and make them available to FDA for inspection and copying upon
request].
As demonstrated by this proposed regulation, the HACCP principles are surreptitiously embedded within
the proposed CGMP regulations. Under proposed section 111.45, the “master manufacturing record” con-
stitutes a crude HACCP plan. In this crude plan, the manufacturer must identify and establish controls
for steps in the manufacturing process “where control is necessary to prevent adulteration”—i.e., critical
limits and critical control points (§111.45(a)). The manufacturer also must institute appropriate monitor-
ing of the control points, as well as corrective action plans when control is not maintained (§111.45(b)(8)).
FDA embodied the veriﬁcation requirement within proposed section 111.45(c), as indicated by the Agency’s
comments to the proposed rule.193 FDA placed the documentation requirement in proposed section 111.125
(referenced in § 111.45(d).
193 Id. at 12204 (“The quality control unit review will ensure that necessary inprocess [sic] veriﬁcations and testing
instructions are included in the master manufacturing record”); FDA also asked for comments as to whether it should require
veriﬁcation procedures for computerized equipment. Id. at 12194.
34Proposed 111.45 does not require a hazard analysis. However, the entire body of proposed CGMP regula-
tions themselves constitute a crude analysis of the various hazards potentially aﬀecting the typical dietary
supplement manufacturing process—e.g., microbes and poor hygiene (proposed § 111.10), poor sanitation
(proposed § 111.15), poor plant design and construction (proposed § 111.20), faulty or improper equip-
ment or utensils (proposed § 111.25), and faulty or improper automatic, mechanical or electronic equipment
(proposed § 111.30).194 Thus, the major HACCP concepts are all present.
The proposed dietary supplement CGMP regulations may lack the purity and bite of HACCP regulations;
furthermore, the covert application of HACCP principles may not suﬃciently focus manufacturers’ attention
on their individual manufacturing processes, and may not provide the desired incentive for industry self-
education and innovation. Yet, given the political context in which FDA operates, the proposed regulations
perhaps represent the most eﬀective manner of introducing the HACCP regulatory strategy to an industry
opposed to radical change.
In conclusion, the future of HACCP looks bright, especially given the potential ﬁnalization of the dietary
supplement CGMP regulations. Additionally, FDA has stated its intention to revisit its food CGMP reg-
ulations, opening up new possibilities for the expansion of HACCP. 195 With respect to the food CGMP
regulations, the Agency asked, “What concepts or underlying principles should guide FDA’s adoption of new
preventive controls [for food manufacturing]?”196 Certainly, the concepts of statistical quality control and
HACCP should play the major roles in guiding FDA’s choice of regulatory scheme.
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